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1. Introduction 
Making predictions about what might happen in 2020 
on the basis of Corbyn’s leadership since September 
2015 is a perilous task. His leadership style will inevita-
bly evolve while Corbyn’s strategy is likely to adapt in 
response to events. Nonetheless, empirical evidence 
indicates that ‘leadership image’ is defined early in a 
leader’s tenure (Bale, 2015); leaders of the opposition 
have found it almost impossible to escape negative 
perceptions formed at the beginning of their period of 
office, as the Conservative party discovered under Wil-
liam Hague and Iain Duncan Smith, and Labour found 
under  Ed Miliband (Richards, 2016). Examining Cor-
byn’s position now cannot tell us with any certainty 
how events will unfold, but provides an interpretation 
of prospective political developments.  
The concept of ‘party leader image’ is examined in 
the emerging scholarly literature on political leader-
ship, particularly on Labour leaders and leaders of the 
opposition (Bale, 2015; Buller & James, 2015; Clarke & 
James, 2015; Heppell, 2012; Theakston, 2012). A set of 
criteria has been developed within American political 
science, analysing leadership through the investigation 
of behavioural and cognitive traits (Foley, 2008; Green-
stein, 2009). However, these leadership attributes are 
not necessarily appropriate to the context of Britain 
and continental Europe, particularly when applied to 
non-presidential political systems. 
Corbyn offers an intriguing case-study for under-
standing the performance of British opposition leaders. 
Firstly, his victory in the Labour leadership contest was 
unexpected: ‘one of the most extraordinary political 
sagas in recent decades’ (Richards, 2016, p. 17). At the 
outset, members of the Campaign Group in the Parlia-
mentary Labour Party (PLP) debated whether it was 
worth running a candidate; of 1200 party members 
surveyed in the summer of 2015, only two believed 
Corbyn would become leader; another demoralising 
defeat for the organised Left, on the defensive since 
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the demise of Tony Benn’s influence in the 1980s, ap-
peared inevitable (Bale & Webb, 2015). Corbyn told 
The Guardian in June 2015 that his chances were slim: 
“We had a discussion among a group of us on the 
Left about how we might influence future devel-
opments of the party. All of us felt the leadership 
contest was not a good idea—there should have 
been a policy debate first. There wasn’t so we de-
cided somebody should put their hat in the ring to 
promote that debate. And, unfortunately, it’s my 
hat in the ring.” (cited in Hattenstone, 2015) 
Secondly, Corbyn arguably possesses few conventional 
attributes of a ‘successful’ political leader: he is inexpe-
rienced having never previously held high office either 
in a Labour government or within the party bureaucra-
cy (Richards, 2016). Ross McKibbin (2015, p. 26) con-
cludes Corbyn ‘is probably unique in his lack of conven-
tional qualifications for the job’. His experience of 
handling the national media and overseeing the party’s 
organisational machinery was non-existent. Corbyn 
served as an official in a public sector union, but his ex-
perience of trade union politics was limited (Wintour & 
Watt, 2015). He was regarded as a maverick and serial 
rebel with few allies in the parliamentary party; he had 
long-standing ties to Irish republicanism (Fenton, 2015) 
while allegedly expressing sympathy with Hamas and 
Iran in the Middle-East (Finlay, 2015). It was precisely 
Corbyn’s lack of conventional qualifications, his status 
as the heroic ‘anti-candidate’ that enabled him to win 
(McKibbin, 2015). According to his colleague, Clive 
Lewis: 
“Jeremy is Jeremy. He isn’t a rock star politician, he 
doesn’t have the looks, he doesn’t wear slick 
clothes, but in a way he is an anti-hero. He’s genu-
ine, authentic and he just seems to have resonated 
with people.” (cited in Wintour & Watt, 2015) 
Thirdly, the circumstances of Corbyn’s victory were un-
usual: the new leadership election procedure had been 
intended to strengthen democratic participation in the 
Labour party, as well as dealing with adverse publicity 
encountered by Labour over the parliamentary selec-
tion in the Scottish seat of Falkirk (Syal, 2014). The clas-
sical thesis of ‘the cartel party’ is that power within so-
cial democratic parties across Europe is shifting from 
the grassroots to the ‘party in office’ (Katz & Mair, 
2009); yet the Corbyn phenomenon appears to refute 
Katz and Mair’s thesis. Centre-left parties are experi-
menting with new methods of democratisation intended 
to revitalise their social base and political appeal (Fau-
cher, 2015). Nonetheless, it is unclear whether democra-
tisation makes opposition parties more electable; it may 
produce less predictable outcomes in leadership elec-
tions, as the Corbyn ascendency underlines.  
Finally, Corbyn has claimed he would be different to 
previous leaders, in particular, Tony Blair. In style and 
disposition, Corbyn is the antithesis not merely of Blair, 
but of almost all previous post-war Labour leaders in-
cluding Attlee, Wilson, Callaghan and Kinnock. There is 
a passing resemblance to Michael Foot given his com-
mitment to anti-American unilateralism and pacificism; 
however, Foot attained high office in the 1974-79 La-
bour administration and was regarded as a conciliator 
in party terms. The most telling comparison is between 
Corbyn and George Lansbury (Fielding, 2016), leader 
from 1931 until 1935: to those who found Ramsay 
MacDonald’s ‘betrayal’ in 1931 repugnant, Lansbury 
was a ‘prophet’ and ‘poet’, an inspirational figure who 
would have led Labour to a great election victory; to 
others his ‘ritual martyrdom’ and ‘woolly-minded sen-
timentality’ threatened the party’s status as a serious 
contender for office leading to his defenestration at 
the hands of Ernest Bevin, who famously told Lansbury 
at the 1935 party conference, ‘stop hawking your con-
science around from body to body asking to be told 
what you ought to do with it’ (cited in Reid & Pelling, 
2005, p. 69; Fielding, 2016). 
Corbyn rejects the moderate and pragmatic tradi-
tion of post-war leadership espoused in very different 
ways by Attlee, Wilson, Callaghan, Kinnock, Smith, Blair 
and Brown. In this sense, Corbyn’s ascendency marks a 
watershed in the politics of the Labour party, and in 
the nature of British political leadership. The parallel 
with Lansbury is apposite: Corbyn and Lansbury be-
came leader following an economic crisis in which 
moderate social democracy was discredited; their op-
ponents, MacDonald and Blair, were both subject to a 
‘betrayal myth’; having attained high office they alleg-
edly abandoned socialism and were often willing to col-
laborate with the Conservative party. MacDonald and 
Lansbury were reputably polar opposites in the 1930s; 
Corbyn is the reverse of Blair in the contemporary con-
text (Fielding, 2016). In particular, Corbyn’s victory has 
been interpreted as a repudiation of Blair’s approach 
to ‘managing’ the Labour party, apparently centred on 
tactics of covert manipulation of party institutions that 
led eventually to the New Labour leader’s downfall 
(Minkin, 2014). 
Having clarified what makes Corbyn’s leadership 
distinctive, this article will proceed in the following 
way. The first section will delineate the criteria by 
which the performance of opposition leaders has been 
assessed in the academic literature. The paper will in-
corporate yardsticks for evaluating political leadership 
developed by Stuart Ball (2005) and Tim Bale (2015). 
The second section addresses Corbyn’s performance 
since his election in September 2015, drawing on aca-
demic commentaries, journalistic accounts and survey 
data. The final part of the paper will indicate what we 
might expect from Corbyn’s tenure as Labour leader. 
While assessments of leadership traditionally focus on 
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the imperatives of winning elections and office-
seeking, it is important that we do not adopt an overly 
restrictive understanding of politics: for Corbyn and his 
supporters, electability is not the sole purpose of the 
Labour party. They insist that policies should be pur-
sued according to whether they are right in principle, 
irrespective of whether they enable Labour to win elec-
tions (Richards, 2016).  
2. Judging the Performance of Party Leaders 
Jim Buller and Toby James (2011, pp. 535-536) assess 
the performance of party leaders by focusing on five 
elements of ‘statecraft’: forging a winning electoral 
strategy; achieving a reputation for governing compe-
tence; efficient management of the party machine; 
winning the key arguments among opinion-formers 
and the political elite; and reforming the constitution 
to protect the party’s electoral interests. They draw on 
Jim Bulpitt’s seminal article on Thatcherism where po-
litical leadership is defined as the rational pursuit and 
maintenance of high office (Bulpitt, 1986). Buller and 
James insist the statecraft interpretation provides a 
useful heuristic: it focuses attention on leadership 
‘cliques’ while taking account of the structural context 
in which leaders operate.  
There are, however, problems with the statecraft 
approach in evaluating Corbyn’s leadership. As Griffiths 
(2015) indicates, statecraft raises a number of meth-
odological and epistemological issues for political sci-
entists. Bulpitt construes politicians as ‘office-seekers’ 
intent on winning power: in ontological terms, this im-
plies a limited and exclusive definition of politics which 
neglects other elements of political behaviour (Grif-
fiths, 2015, p. 4). The criticism is appropriate when ap-
plied to Corbyn, who insists that upholding ‘moral prin-
ciples’ outweighs attaining parliamentary power in the 
British state. In addition, the concept of statecraft is 
problematic as an epistemology: Bulpitt (1986) cannot 
demonstrate that office-seeking is ‘the main bias’ of 
politicians, even in the case of Margaret Thatcher; poli-
ticians tell us something about why they act and think 
as they do through biographies and retrospective ac-
counts, but they are notoriously prone to post hoc ra-
tionalisation (Griffiths, 2015, p. 5). Moreover, Bulpitt 
focuses on the behaviour of the ‘court’ and insular 
‘clique’ surrounding the leader, but in so doing ignores 
institutions and actors beyond the sphere of ‘high poli-
tics’ (Buller, 1999; Griffiths, 2015, p. 7). In the Labour 
party, these include the parliamentary party, the trade 
unions, the National Executive Committee (NEC), local 
government, and the party membership, all of whom 
are capable of constraining the leadership’s room for 
manoeuvre.  
Bulpitt’s concept of statecraft eschews ideology 
emphasising the rational pursuit of power, a useful cor-
rective to accounts of Thatcherism that focus on ideo-
logical motivations; yet an understanding of statecraft 
is inadequate when applied to Corbyn’s leadership 
style. Corbyn is not a politician driven by the impera-
tives of the statecraft approach. He rejects the politics 
of ‘valence’ in favour of ‘position’ and principle, the 
claim that politicians should support policies and ethi-
cal causes beyond their impact on electoral perfor-
mance and governing competence. As Buller (1999, p. 
703) points out, even the Thatcher and Major admin-
istrations ‘provide examples of the party leadership pur-
suing policy ideas with little or no respect for the State-
craft Strategy apparently underlying them’. Corbyn’s 
leadership is rooted in ‘position’ rather than ‘perfor-
mance’ (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2014). 
While Bulpitt treats ideology as significant only in so far 
as it enables politicians to win elections, Corbyn assigns 
primary importance to ideology and ethical beliefs.  
Mark Bennister, Paul t’Hart and Ben Worthy (2015) 
adopt a markedly different approach, applying the con-
cept of ‘political capital’ derived from Pierre Bourdieu 
to the study of leadership. They argue that political au-
thority is a scarce resource that leaders must use wise-
ly: they need the skills and capabilities to be an effec-
tive leader while leaders have to mobilise and motivate 
their own supporters; for that reason, political capital 
wherever possible has to be replenished (Bennister, 
t’Hart, & Worthy, 2015). These scholars draw attention 
to the ‘dynamic interplay’ between the leader’s per-
sonal characteristics and the structural environment 
they confront: some leaders seek to overcome institu-
tional constraints; others are content to accept the 
prevailing political context. Bennister, t’Hart and Wor-
thy’s ‘leadership capital index’ then emphasises four 
criteria of ‘public communication’, ‘policy platform’, 
‘party management’, and ‘emotional intelligence’ to 
distinguish between distinctive types of political leader: 
depleted ‘lame duck’ leaders who are barely in office; 
‘low capital’ leaders presiding over demoralised and di-
vided parties; ‘medium capital’ leaders who are con-
tent to ‘muddle through’ and get by; ‘high capital’ 
leaders who gain momentum from legislative and elec-
toral success; and ‘exceptional capital’ leaders who are 
in a position to ‘make the weather’ (Bennister, t’Hart, 
& Worthy, 2015).  
The leadership capital index is an important con-
ceptual tool in the study of political leadership; howev-
er, it is better suited to the study of leaders in govern-
ment rather than opposition. In contrast, Ball (2005, 
pp. 4-5) and Bale (2015, pp. 61-62) have outlined five 
criteria by which to judge an effective opposition lead-
er, drawing on their respective studies of the British 
Conservative party: 
 First, ‘fresh faces’: does the leadership promote 
talent to signal a change of political generations 
and the renewal of the party in the wake of 
electoral defeat? 
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 Second, ‘cohesion’: are they able to maintain 
loyalty and discipline to project a unified image 
to the electorate; divided parties have rarely 
enjoyed sustained electoral success?  
 Third, ‘visibility’: is the leader able to fashion a 
distinctive, eye-catching agenda which captures 
the imagination of the electorate, wins the 
confidence of opinion-formers to project 
governing credibility, and distances the party 
from a potentially ‘toxic legacy’?  
 Fourth, ‘efficiency’: has the leader been able to 
build a party machine that can take on the 
government of the day, the basis for election 
victory?  
 Finally, ‘adaptability’: is the party leadership 
sufficiently pragmatic to respond to events, 
changing its strategy where necessary to win 
power?  
These five yardsticks offer comprehensive if parsimo-
nious criteria for assessing the performance of opposi-
tion leaders. Leonard Stark defined three attributes for 
successful opposition leaders: the ability to maintain 
‘party unity’, to make the party ‘electable’, and to pro-
ject an image of ‘competence’ – the capacity to deliver 
on policy commitments in office (Denham & Dorey, 
2015). In contrast, Ball’s criteria underline the enor-
mous challenge party leaders out of government face: 
it is unsurprising that being Leader of the Opposition is 
viewed as a thankless task. Opposition leaders have 
limited resources; their access to the media is restrict-
ed; they are rarely able to shape events; and more time 
is spent reacting to initiatives launched by the govern-
ing party (Bale, 2015). In the following section of the 
article, Ball and Bale’s framework is applied to evaluate 
Corbyn’s brief tenure as leader.  
3. Assessing Jeremy Corbyn as Labour Leader  
Jeremy Corbyn was elected with 59.5 per cent of first 
preference votes giving him an unprecedented man-
date: he almost won a simple majority in all sections of 
the Electoral College: 84 per cent of newly registered 
supporters who paid £3 to join the party after the May 
2015 election voted for him, as did 57.6 per cent of the 
affiliated trade unions and 49.6 per cent of full mem-
bers (Gamble, 2015; Mason, 2015a). However, only 15 
out of 232 Labour MPs cast their first preference votes 
for Corbyn. In total, Labour now has 565,000 members 
and registered supporters, compared to 185,000 full 
members when Ed Miliband was elected in 2010; this is 
a significant development in the political and social 
composition of the party (Rutherford, 2015). Corbyn’s 
supporters have been divided into three groups: the 
generation of ‘baby-boomers’ who grew increasingly 
disillusioned with New Labour as instinctive supporters 
of oppressed minorities; young people who have been 
alienated by austerity, the sharp rise in university tui-
tion fees, and the inaccessibility of the housing market; 
as well as white collar employees in the public sector 
who stand to lose most from the retrenchment of the 
state (Rutherford, 2015). More than two-thirds of La-
bour party members are middle-class (ABC1s); 56 per 
cent are university graduates and 44 per cent are em-
ployed in the public sector (Bale & Webb, 2015).  
In this context Corbyn might be classified, like Tony 
Benn, as a ‘post-bourgeois’ politician: 
“‘Post-bourgeois’, a term of art in American political 
science, describes the politics of the post-industrial 
society in which acquisitiveness among the increas-
ingly affluent and educated middle-classes suppos-
edly gives way to less material values, such as par-
ticipation or free speech.” (Jenkins, 1981, p. 4) 
Corbyn emphasises freedom, democracy, participation 
and openness in decision-making which supplanted the 
traditional materialist preoccupations of the labour 
movement in Britain since the 1960s and 1970s. As-
sembling a socially diverse coalition ostensibly opposed 
to austerity, inequality and western military hegemony 
has been a political triumph (Gamble, 2015); as the poll-
ing organisation You Gov has pointed out, however, 
Corbyn’s supporters are ‘not remotely representative of 
the country’. Detractors of Corbyn observe that the 
growth of party membership and the increased turnout 
for the party leader at political rallies appears to be in di-
rect contradiction to the esteem in which he is held by 
citizens. This observation is consistent with Kenig’s 
(2009) comparative survey which indicates that democ-
ratising political parties does not make them more elec-
torally competitive or connected to voters; a wider 
membership may be no more representative of the 
country.  
How well does Corbyn score on the criteria for op-
position party leaders delineated by Ball (2005) and 
Bale (2015)? On the positive side of the balance-sheet, 
Corbyn has been assiduous in promoting ‘fresh faces’ 
in his front-bench team, taking advantage of the re-
form introduced by Ed Miliband that the leader should 
have the right to select their Shadow Cabinet rather 
than a vote in the PLP. The 2010 and 2015 intakes have 
featured heavily in Corbyn’s Shadow Cabinet through 
the appointment of Heidi Alexander as Shadow Health 
Secretary and Owen Smith as Shadow Work and Pen-
sions Secretary. The new Shadow Chancellor, John 
MacDonnell has never held ministerial office, while 
none of Labour’s economic team has any previous as-
sociation with the Blair-Brown era, giving the party the 
opportunity to move on from the 2008 financial crisis 
which severely eroded its reputation for economic 
competence (Wintour & Watt, 2015). It is anticipated 
that younger MPs on the Left from the 2015 intake 
such as Clive Lewis and Cat Smith will soon occupy 
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prominent Shadow Cabinet positions (Mason, 2015a). 
Many of the politicians from the pre-2010 era have ei-
ther departed front-line politics or retired.  
Corbyn’s team also moved to promote party ‘cohe-
sion’, emphasising unity in the wake of a divisive and 
fractious leadership contest. Corbyn adopted three dis-
tinct party management strategies: he accommodated 
a diversity of views within his Shadow Cabinet retaining 
prominent ‘Blairites’ such as Lord Falconer and (until 
recently) Pat McFadden as Shadow Europe minister; 
Corbyn sought to mobilise the party’s activist base by 
allowing and even encouraging internal dissent and 
debate; and he fought to assert control over party poli-
cy especially in foreign affairs, notably on intervention 
in Syria and the renewal of Trident (Finlay, 2015). Cor-
byn’s objective in undertaking the January 2016 reshuf-
fle was to enhance his authority over foreign policy and 
defence, ensuring the opposition spoke with ‘one 
voice’ (Kettle, 2016). The reshuffle removed McFadden 
and the Shadow Culture Secretary, Michael Dugher 
while demoting Maria Eagle, Shadow Defence Secre-
tary, and triggering the resignation of three junior La-
bour spokespeople (Stephen Doughty, Jonathan Reyn-
olds, and Kevan Jones). Most so-called ‘moderate’ MPs 
have continued to serve on the front bench. Corbyn 
has been able to call on the instinct of loyalty firmly en-
trenched within the ‘ethos’ of the party (Drucker, 
1978). At the same time, unity is enforced by reminding 
MPs of the strength of Corbyn’s mandate, and the ex-
tent of grassroots support encapsulated in the Left’s or-
ganisation, ‘Momentum’. He may lack formal credentials 
and experience, but Corbyn secured a decisive mandate 
in September 2015: democratic leadership contests are 
‘rituals of legitimation’ (Faucher, 2015, p. 812). 
In relation to ‘visibility’, Corbyn has been able to 
call upon support from commentators on The Guardian 
and The Morning Star who advocate a radical alterna-
tive to ‘austerity-lite’ policies (Chakrabortty, 2015). 
Even Martin Wolf, The Financial Times commentator, 
argues that Corbyn is right to confront ‘outworn shib-
boleths’ and to develop policies that improve the rate 
of growth by forging an ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘strate-
gic’ state (Wolf, 2015). On issues such as withdrawal of 
tax credits, Labour has apparently put the government 
on the ‘defensive’, combining to force George Osborne 
to undertake a ‘u-turn’ in his autumn statement (Ma-
son, 2015a). If the recovery in the British economy 
stagnates during 2016 because of a global slowdown 
and fear of an impending ‘Brexit’, Corbyn’s ‘radical’ 
economic alternative may gain traction. And if Prime 
Minister’s Questions (PMQs) are a critical opportunity 
for the Leader of the Opposition to enhance his author-
ity and credibility, Corbyn’s performances have won 
some reasonable reviews; the tactics of using ques-
tions proposed by ‘real voters’ has occasionally un-
nerved the Prime Minister (Mason, 2015a).  
Labour’s leader sought to emphasise his economic 
credibility by appointing a group of internationally re-
nowned economists to his panel of advisers, notably 
Joseph Stiglitz, Thomas Piketty, Simon Wren-Lewis, and 
David Blanchflower. Three notable policies have been 
proposed by Corbyn’s team: a state investment bank to 
support public infrastructure through ‘people’s Quanti-
tative Easing’; an extensive ‘crackdown’ on tax evasion 
and tax avoidance to reclaim more than £120 billion in 
lost revenue (Wintour & Watt, 2015); and the re-
nationalisation of the railways bringing franchises back 
into public ownership (Mason, 2015b). Corbyn has 
moved to beef up Labour’s communications capability, 
appointing Seamus Milne, a senior Guardian journalist, 
as Executive Director of Strategy and Communications. 
Particular emphasis has been given to the importance 
of social media in reaching beyond the mainstream 
press. This approach aims to capitalise on Corbyn’s 
strategic advantage: his ‘authenticity’ and his distance 
from the tactical ‘evasions’ of the political class 
(McKibbin, 2015).  
In promoting Labour’s ‘efficiency’ as an opposition, 
Corbyn has defied pessimistic predictions, most nota-
bly in the December 2015 Oldham by-election in which 
Labour’s share of the vote increased, although this was 
mainly due to a sharp reduction in support for the Con-
servative party since May 2015. Labour appears well 
placed to mount a serious challenge in the London 
mayoral contest (Mason, 2015c). The key to mobilisa-
tion is the growth of membership; it is hoped this will 
release new political energy enabling Labour to be-
come an organisation akin to a social movement as 
well as an election-winning machine; members will 
contribute more than £8 million to the funding base of 
the party, making Labour less reliant on corporate do-
nations (Gamble, 2015); however, the proposed re-
forms of trade union finance will require union mem-
bers to ‘opt in’ to the political fund.  
Finally, Corbyn has demonstrated a willingness to 
adapt pragmatically to circumstances. He has shifted 
position on UK membership of the European Union 
(EU) in response to pressure from the parliamentary 
party, and the wider membership; 85 per cent of 
members will vote for Britain to remain in the EU (Bale 
& Webb, 2015). On Syria, he eventually conceded a 
‘free vote’, minimising resignations from his Shadow 
Cabinet. Despite his radical mandate, Corbyn has acted 
cautiously on economic policy; his Shadow Chancellor 
has struck a moderate tone, even signing up to Os-
borne’s Charter of Fiscal Responsibility on the eve of 
the Labour conference (although the position was later 
reversed) (Watt, 2016). There is an awareness that La-
bour has suffered from the absence of economic credi-
bility; the party needs to tread cautiously in making 
new commitments on tax and spending; few concrete 
policies have been forthcoming (Richards, 2016). This 
tactic indicates that Corbyn is prepared to act pragmat-
ically where necessary.  
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Despite this, Corbyn’s leadership still has notable 
vulnerabilities reflected in recent opinion surveys. 
These weaknesses are less to do with ideological posi-
tioning on the Left-Right spectrum;1 they stem from 
the fact that too few voters believe Corbyn is capable 
of being Prime Minister. A poll conducted within days 
of Corbyn’s victory indicated 30 per cent of voters be-
lieved he would perform ‘well’ as leader, but 48 per 
cent feared he would do ‘badly’; only 17 per cent 
thought it was likely Labour would win the next elec-
tion (61 per cent believed Labour would lose) (You Gov, 
2015). Just 23 per cent of voters thought Labour could 
be ‘trusted’ to run the economy, against 50 per cent 
who did not. The economy was a major weakness un-
der Ed Miliband as the party’s reputation for financial 
stewardship had been undermined following the 2008 
crisis; but Labour’s position has weakened further un-
der Corbyn: 40 per cent of voters trust the Conserva-
tives to ‘take the right decisions’ on the economy, 
against 23 per cent for Labour (Kellner, 2015b). Corbyn 
continues to rate highly among voters on attributes of 
‘honesty’ (35 per cent) and ‘principle’ (43 per cent). At 
the same time, by November 2015, 52 per cent be-
lieved Corbyn was performing poorly, against 32 per 
cent who thought he was doing well; only 14 per cent 
felt Corbyn was likely to become Prime Minister, while 
39 per cent wanted him to stand down immediately 
(Kellner, 2015a).  
Examining Ball (2005) and Bale’s (2015) criteria 
provides an indication of Corbyn’s exposed position. 
Inept party management has been an important factor 
(Kettle, 2016). Corbyn came under criticism following 
his first round of Shadow Cabinet appointments, failing 
to appoint more women to senior positions and un-
dermining his commitment to bring in more ‘fresh fac-
es’. The front bench reshuffle in January 2016 was at-
tacked for being incompetently co-ordinated, lasting 
more than three days and exacerbating the perception 
that Labour was a divided party (Watt, 2016). The re-
shuffle was a reminder of the constraints under which 
Corbyn is operating: having initially briefed the press 
that the Shadow Foreign Secretary, Hilary Benn, and 
the Shadow Chief Whip, Rosie Winterton would be 
casualties, Corbyn’s team were forced to retreat after 
an overwhelmingly hostile reaction from the PLP (Ket-
tle, 2016).  
The ‘cohesion’ of the party has been undermined 
by the structural problem that Corbyn’s leadership con-
fronts: his narrow base of PLP support. Having won the 
votes of only 15 MPs in the leadership contest (the 
other 20 MPs who nominated him did so to ensure the 
Left had a candidate), Corbyn has fought to maintain 
his legitimacy within the parliamentary party. As a ‘se-
                                                          
1 On a Left–Right scale from +100 (very right-wing) to -100 
(very left-wing), the average voter places themselves close to 
zero; Corbyn is judged to be -76 (You Gov, 2015). 
rial rebel’ under previous leaders, he has struggled to 
play the loyalty card effectively. There is now a fault-
line with the PLP on one side, and grassroots members 
on the other (Gamble, 2015). The handling of Trident 
and Syria indicates major party management problems; 
Corbyn’s ‘prevarication’ about whether to allow a free 
vote on Syrian intervention in December 2015 signalled 
he has no convincing strategy to manage his parlia-
mentary colleagues; the attempt to put pressure on 
MPs through directives from Momentum and the deci-
sion to conduct a last minute plebiscite among party 
members merely antagonised them (66 MPs then vot-
ed with the Government following a passionate speech 
by Hilary Benn in the final debate) (Richards, 2016). 
Corbyn’s objective is to democratise the Labour party 
promoting greater participation and pluralism, but op-
ponents insist he is intent on purging Labour of its re-
sidual Blairite elements (Dathan, 2016). We will return 
to this theme in the concluding section.  
Corbyn has encountered additional problems in 
projecting ‘visibility’. He had been written-off by most 
opinion formers and a hostile press even as his victory 
in the leadership contest was confirmed; controversy 
over the reshuffle led to open disagreement with the 
BBC over the coverage of a frontbenchers’ resignation 
(Watt, 2016). While The Guardian/Observer have a 
combined audience of 5.3 million, the vociferously hos-
tile Sun and Sun (Sunday) have 13.5 million readers 
(Hollander, 2013). There are doubts about the breadth 
of Corbyn’s appeal given his cultural identity as a Left-
wing metropolitan liberal representing the constituen-
cy of Islington North, allegedly ‘a world away’ from the 
concerns of most uncommitted Labour voters (a suspi-
cion reinforced by the appointment of Emily Thornber-
ry, Corbyn’s Islington neighbour, as Shadow Secretary 
of State for Defence). It is claimed that a moderate ver-
sion of Corbyn’s views on the central policy issues re-
lating to the economy, welfare, immigration and for-
eign affairs was decisively rejected by voters in the 
2015 general election (Rutherford, 2015).  
The relief among Corbyn’s team following Labour’s 
victory in the Oldham by-election underlines that he is 
not in a position to ignore or discount electability (Pidd, 
2015). It might be argued that any leader would have a 
formidable task in restoring Labour’s ‘efficiency’ as an 
opposition party. Labour has not won a major election 
for a decade while the party has suffered a sharp ero-
sion of support due to the unpopularity of its previous 
leaders and its inability to manage the immigration 
question (Clarke et al., 2014; Evans & Chzhen, 2013). 
The 2015 election underlined the fracturing of Labour’s 
electoral base, particularly in Scotland where the par-
ty’s vote haemorrhaged. Labour faces testing Scottish 
parliamentary elections in May 2016 and may lose its 
majority in the Welsh Assembly where a recent poll in-
dicated the party would decline to 27 seats (three 
short of a majority) (BBC, 2016); it has not won a Lon-
 Politics and Governance, 2016, Volume 4, Issue 2, Pages 15-24 21 
don mayoral election since 2004. In the North of Eng-
land, Labour’s traditional strongholds have been under 
attack from the UK Independence Party (Ford & Good-
win, 2014). The social base of the labour movement, 
notably trade union membership, has suffered a 
marked decline since the 1980s, particularly in the pri-
vate sector (Richards, 2016). Labour’s travails cannot 
be attributed solely to Corbyn’s leadership perfor-
mance, but as Curtice points out: ‘it can often be diffi-
cult to disentangle cause and effect in the relationship 
between a party’s overall standing and the rating of its 
leader’ (cited in Bale, 2015, p. 59). 
Finally, there are limits to Corbyn’s ‘adaptability’ 
which might undermine his success. He largely rejects 
the hard-headed instincts of previous leaders, while his 
commitment to Labour as a party of government is 
ambiguous. Corbyn’s supporters are less motivated by 
the imperative of winning elections; they want to ar-
ticulate their values and reject the New Labour legacy 
of Iraq and inequality (Rutherford, 2015). 71 per cent 
of those who voted for Corbyn in the leadership con-
test believed parties should put forward policies ‘irre-
spective of whether they help to win elections’ 
(Kellner, 2015a). This rejection of orthodoxy was un-
derlined by Corbyn’s refusal to sing the national an-
them at a Remembrance Day service, and his equivoca-
tion about whether to become a member of the Privy 
Council (Mason, 2015c). In rejecting New Labour, Cor-
byn is emphasising his reluctance to play the game of 
‘valence’ politics, despite the fact ‘valence’ remains the 
best predictor of electoral outcomes in Western Euro-
pean democracies (Clarke et. al., 2014). For McKibbin 
(2015), the danger for Corbyn is that he is compelled to 
compromise too far, disillusioning his own supporters. 
This disposition makes future ‘adaptability’ and prag-
matism less likely.  
4. The Verdict: A Different Type of Leader? 
Assessing Corbyn’s performance ostensibly indicates a 
mixed picture. Applying the criteria offered by Ball 
(2005) and Bale (2015), Corbyn’s leadership cannot be 
portrayed as an outright failure after seven months in 
office. In promoting new talent, partially maintaining 
unity and discipline, and achieving ‘visibility’ and ‘effi-
ciency’ in relation to the party machinery, Corbyn can 
point to achievements. There is a disjuncture between 
his portrayal as ‘unfit’ to be Prime Minister and his per-
formance as opposition leader. While Corbyn’s ratings 
appear negative, this does not mean he is an incompe-
tent Leader of the Opposition, or that his party cannot 
win a general election (Bale, 2015, p. 71). It is not only 
‘party leader images’ that are decisive, but partisan 
identification and how far the party is trusted to man-
age the economy (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & White-
ley, 2011). Corbyn rejects the emphasis given to elec-
toral success as a measure of leadership performance; 
‘statecraft’ approaches encourage an ontologically nar-
row view of politics (Griffiths, 2015). If Corbyn struggles 
to make progress on the criteria of electability and 
prime ministerial credibility, he has energised thou-
sands of supporters while striving to alter the domi-
nant discourse with his commitment to ‘straight talk-
ing, honest politics’. Even if we adopt a fundamentally 
pluralistic view of leadership attributes, however, Cor-
byn still faces major impediments to success while his 
performance so far has been problematic.  
Firstly, Corbyn is a leader operating in a parliamen-
tary system in which he does not have the support of 
the majority of his MPs: ‘At this moment of great tri-
umph, he suddenly finds himself more trapped as a 
politician than he has ever been’ (Richards, 2016, p. 
12). The decision to downgrade the role of MPs in the 
leadership selection process creates a structural divi-
sion in the party. Leaders had been elected by the PLP 
for three quarters of a century since 1906 (Denham, 
2013). This system had the advantage that MPs them-
selves had a mandate from their own electors, and an 
understanding of what was necessary for the party to 
win elections; the marginalisation of the PLP and the 
abolition of the previous Electoral College are likely to 
prove destabilising (McKibbin, 2015).  
Corbyn’s route to success is to operate as a ‘Bona-
partist’ figure, mobilising the mass ranks of the party 
membership. This conflicts with the Left’s traditional 
view of party democracy, however, which has empha-
sised the importance of holding the leader in check by 
dispersing authority and power across a plurality of in-
stitutions, namely the PLP, the NEC, the trade unions, 
and the party conference; it was conference in particu-
lar that was believed to be the party’s ‘sovereign body’ 
(Faucher, 2015). The Left felt uncomfortable with ‘he-
ro-worshipping’ leaders, insisting leadership was a col-
lective endeavour; since MacDonald, it feared Labour’s 
leaders would betray socialism, mesmerised by the 
‘aristocratic embrace’ of the political establishment 
(Cronin, 2004; Faucher, 2015). In the 1970s, it was be-
lieved that Labour governments had refused to imple-
ment party policy, fuelling demands for democratisa-
tion reasserting the authority of conference (Cronin, 
2004, p. 217). The ‘Bennite’ Campaign for Labour Party 
Democracy (CLPD) was focused on how to ensure the 
leadership remained loyal to the programme agreed at 
the annual conference. Corbyn in 2016 would like dif-
ferent rules to apply, using his support among mem-
bers to control the PLP; however, the trade unions, as 
well as the parliamentary party, are reluctant to allow 
the leader to act unilaterally, particularly on the touch-
stone issue of Trident renewal (Watt, 2016).  
Secondly, Corbyn is self-evidently a ‘position’ politi-
cian in an era of valence and ‘performance’ politics. 
Since the 1980s, British politics has become increasing-
ly focused on performance, mediated through party 
leaders and their ability to deliver competent, efficient 
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government (Clarke et. al., 2014). Arguably, his inten-
tion is not merely to win the general election, but to 
permanently transform both the Labour party and the 
terms of debate in British politics (Gamble, 2015). Cor-
byn’s supporters are motivated by ‘his manifest oppo-
sition to the dominant ideology of modern Britain, to 
the ‘system’ and its disreputable character’ (McKibbin, 
2015, p. 26). This point underlines the inadequacy of 
statecraft approaches: Corbyn’s ‘main bias’ is not of-
fice-seeking but ideological transformation (Gamble, 
2015). Corbyn perceives the role of ideology as more 
than an instrument for attaining power. In 2005, a 
group of Labour voters defected because they objected 
to the position adopted by Blair on Iraq: they believed 
the war had been catastrophically handled as no 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) were discov-
ered; the escalation of the conflict appeared to en-
courage the growth of Al Qaida in the Middle-East 
(Clarke et. al., 2014). As Clarke et al. (2014, p. 6) indi-
cate, there are two predominant models of voter 
choice: the ‘valence’ model which emphasises compe-
tence, leadership and credibility, and the ‘positional’ 
model which infers ‘people vote for the party that is 
closest to them on the issue or set of issues that mat-
ters most’. In so far as elections matter, Corbyn’s lead-
ership is predicated on a positional view of voter be-
haviour influenced by voters’ disquiet over the Iraq 
war; over the last forty years, valence has nevertheless 
provided ‘more powerful statistical explanations of vot-
ing’. It is the capacity of valence to trump positional 
strategies that casts doubt on Corbyn’s approach.  
The crisis confronting the Labour party is that it ap-
pears divided between diametrically opposing political 
traditions: the pragmatic, ‘office-seeking’ tradition of 
Wilson and Blair which is still heavily represented with-
in the PLP; and the ‘politics of conscience’ practised by 
Lansbury and Corbyn now embodied in the grassroots 
of the party (Fielding, 2016). One strategy is to attempt 
to reconcile these traditions, narrowing the gap be-
tween principle and power (Gamble, 2015). Nonethe-
less, events underline Corbyn’s reluctance to embrace 
ideological and organisational appeasement as a party 
management strategy. Instead, Corbyn’s supporters 
will strive to transform the character of the PLP; repre-
sentatives of the Momentum organisation are urging 
mandatory reselection as they did in the early 1980s, 
while reasserting control over party conference; con-
stituency boundary changes under current party rules 
make it possible to apply further pressure to sitting La-
bour MPs (Gamble, 2015).  
In his approach, Corbyn is striving to ‘make the 
weather’ as leader rather than accepting the structural 
context he inherited. This strategy is comprehensible in 
its own terms; the Left has an unprecedented oppor-
tunity to refashion the Labour party in its image, a po-
sition it will be reluctant to forfeit after decades in the 
wilderness. The risk for Corbyn, however, is that efforts 
to reshape or even ‘purge’ the PLP will recreate the his-
torical schism that nearly destroyed Labour in the early 
1980s. Major question-marks over the viability of Cor-
byn’s leadership of the party in the long-term are likely 
to remain. 
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